Freedom and Determinism

Freedom and Determinism

eBook - 2004
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MIT Press

This collection of contemporary essays by prominent contemporary thinkers on the topics of determinism and free agency concentrates primarily on two areas: the compatibility problem and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. There are also essays on the related fields of determinism and action theory. The book is unique in that it contains up-to-date summaries of the life-work of five influential philosophers: John Earman, Ted Honderich, Keith Lehrer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen. There are also contributions by other familiar and distinguished authors, including Richard Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, and John Perry, as well as important rising philosophers. While most of the articles are written from a Western, analytic perspective, the volume includes a paper that addresses Buddhist perspectives on freedom of the will. With an opening essay written by the editors -- "Freedom and Determinism: A Framework" -- that sets the terms of the discussion, the book provides a remarkably comprehensive set of articles that are of value to a wide audience, from students of philosophy to scholars.


A state-of-the-art collection of previously unpublishedessays on the topics of determinism, free will, moralresponsibility, and action theory, written by some of the mostimportant figures in these fields of study.

Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004
ISBN: 9780262269773
0262269775
Characteristics: 1 online resource (vi, 329 pages) : illustrations

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